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Abstract
We study optimal contracts oﬀered by two ﬁrms competing for the exclusive services of one worker,
who is privately informed about her ability and her motivation. Firms diﬀer both in their production
technology and in the mission they pursue and a motivated worker is keen to be hired by the mission-
oriented ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that the matching of worker types to ﬁrms is always Pareto-eﬃcient. When
the diﬀerence in ﬁrms’ technology is high, only the most eﬃcient ﬁrm is active. When the diﬀerence
is not very high, then agent types sort themselves by motivation: the mission-oriented ﬁrm hires
motivated types and the proﬁt-oriented ﬁrm employs non-motivated ones, independently of ability.
Eﬀort provision is higher when the worker is hired by the mission-oriented ﬁrm, but a compensating
wage diﬀerential might exist: the motivated worker is paid less by the mission-oriented ﬁrm. Such
an earnings penalty is driven entirely by motivation, is increasing in ability and is associated to low
power of incentives.
Jel classiﬁcation: D82, D86, J31, M55.
Key-words: vocational labor market, multi-principals, bidimensional screening, intrinsic moti-
vation, skills.
1 Introduction
There exists a well-established empirical evidence, in the labor economics literature, on compensating
wage diﬀerentials generated by diﬀerences in job characteristics or attributes for which heterogeneous
workers have diﬀerent willingnesses to pay (see Rosen, 1986). In turn, these idiosyncratic willingnesses to
pay are reﬂected in wage diﬀerences across sectors . In particular, the existence of a compensating wage
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diﬀerential between the public and private sectors has been documented by Disney and Gosling (1998)
and Melly (2005) among others. Similarly, Mocan and Tekin (2003), Preston (1989) and Gregg et al.
(2011) show that average wages are lower in the not-for-proﬁt sector relative to the for-proﬁt one.
The idea that intrinsic motivation for being employed in the public or in the not-for-proﬁt sectors (in
general, in mission-oriented industries) might be the source of wage gaps has been proposed by a recent
theoretical literature: see Handy and Katz (1998) for non-proﬁt institutions vs corporations, Heyes (2005)
for vocational vs non-vocational jobs and Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) that analyses applicants’ tastes for
being employed at a speciﬁc ﬁrm. A key prediction of this literature is that relatively low pay and weak
monetary incentives endogenously emerge in sectors and jobs where intrinsic motivation matters. The role
of heterogeneity in workers’ productive ability is somehow neglected by the previous theoretical papers.
Nonetheless, another strand of empirical work points out that the compensating wage diﬀerential
might arise because of a selection bias, given that a wage gap can also reﬂect unobservable diﬀerences in
workers’ ability across sectors (see Goddeeris 1988, Hwang, Reed and Hubbard 1992, Gibbons and Katz
1992, Goux and Maurin 1999).
Therefore, an open question still remains: are wages lower in mission-oriented sectors because of the
lower reservation wage of motivated workers or because of the lower productivity of workers self-selecting
into such sectors?
To this respect, Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) consider heterogeneity in both workers’ productivity and
motivation and show that the public-private earning diﬀerential comes partly from a compensating wage
diﬀerential (motivated workers evaluate more being employed in the public sector) and partly is caused by
selection arising endogenously from the adjustment in prices to diﬀerences in job attributes (on average
more productive workers enter the private sector where remuneration is higher). This result holds when
the demand for the public sector output is suﬃciently low, and when motivation is unrelated to output.
More importantly, they assume that ﬁrms perfectly observe both workers’ characteristics.
However, when workers’ productivity and motivation are the workers’ private information, it becomes
necessary to disentangle the pure wage diﬀerential from the selection eﬀect of ability.
Previous results from theoretical literature admitting for workers’ private information are ambiguous
on whether vocation-based sectors are characterized by lower or higher workers’ productivity on average.
In particular, Handy and Katz (1998) assume that workers’ productivity is identical across motivated
and non-motivated workers. In Delfgaauw and Dur (2007), the impact of workers’ productivity on the
wage rate is ambiguous. Most importantly, Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) characterize the optimal incentive
schemes oﬀered by a public agency when workers diﬀer in laziness (the opposite of productive ability)
and public service motivation. They ﬁnd that, when the public institution has to produce a low output
then it only hires dedicated workers who are characterized by high ability and public service motivation.
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Conversely, when the public agency produces a suﬃciently high output,1 then it attracts all dedicated as
well as the laziest workers in the economy (i.e. the ones characterized by low ability and no vocation).
However they underline that their “model does not necessarily imply that workers in the public sector
are on average more lazy than workers in the private sector” (see page 173).
In our paper, we consider a labor market characterized by two sectors, a mission-oriented or vocational
sector and a proﬁt-oriented or standard sector. Each sector is represented by one ﬁrm only and the two
ﬁrms compete to attract a single worker who is heterogeneous with respect to both her skills and her
intrinsic motivation. These two characteristics are the worker’s private information and are discretely,
independently and uniformly distributed. The two ﬁrms oﬀer screening contracts deﬁned by a task level
(the observable eﬀort) and a non-linear wage rate. Because of competition and strategic interaction
between the two ﬁrms, the worker’s outside options are type-dependent and endogenous and thus we
study a multi-principal framework with bidimensional screening.
Motivated workers care about the mission pursued by the ﬁrm for which they work. More precisely,
the payoﬀ of motivated agents depends on their own type but also on the type of ﬁrm hiring them. When
a motivated worker is hired by the mission-oriented employer, and only by him, she beneﬁts from intrinsic
motivation and enjoys (at least to a certain extent) her personal contribution to the outcome produced by
the ﬁrm. Conversely, all worker types experience a cost from eﬀort provision when hired by an employer,
which can diﬀer across types but which does not depend on the type of employer. Thus, a peculiarity
of our model is that the mission-oriented ﬁrm will have to design screening contracts based on both
dimensions of private information, while the proﬁt-oriented ﬁrm will have to oﬀer the same contract to
workers with the same ability level, taking into account that their outside options might diﬀer depending
on their intrinsic motivation.
The two ﬁrms’ technologies are heterogeneous in that the marginal productivity of labor is diﬀerent
across sectors. When the diﬀerence in ﬁrms’ technology is high, the most eﬃcient ﬁrm succeeds in hiring
all types of workers while the other ﬁrm is inactive.
When the diﬀerence in technology is not very high, then the mission-oriented ﬁrm has an advantage in
hiring motivated types because of labor-donation aspect inherent in intrinsic motivation. This represents
the most interesting case to analyze in fact, where agent types sort themselves by motivation: the
mission-oriented ﬁrm hires motivated types and the proﬁt-oriented ﬁrm employs non-motivated ones.
Eﬀort provision is almost always higher for motivated workers. Notably, with respect to our research
question, our results show that workers’ self-selection is ability-neutral. Indeed, we assume that the
distribution of types is uniform, so that average ability is identical across sectors. This result would diﬀer
when alternative distributions of types are considered: if ability and intrinsic motivation are negatively
correlated, then workers would again self-select according to motivation and average ability would be
1That is the opposite condition that is considered in Delfgaauw and Dur (2010).
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lower in the mission-oriented sector relative to the proﬁt-oriented one.
We show that the allocation arising in equilibrium depends on the interplay between two diﬀerent
forces: the degree of competition on one side, determining the importance of workers’ outside options, and
the relevance of internal incentive compatibility on the other side. In particular, if competition is harsh,
because ﬁrms are similar in technology and motivation is not too relevant, then both principals oﬀer ﬁrst-
best contracts to hired workers. In this case, outside options turn out to be more relevant than incentive
compatibility and the equilibrium allocation is similar to the equilibrium with full information. Instead,
if competition is mild, because ﬁrms are suﬃciently diﬀerent from each other, then both principals oﬀer
second-best contracts to hired workers. Here incentive compatibility is the driving force and equilibrium
contracts are similar to the ones we observe under monopsony. Otherwise, when the degree of competition
is neither harsh nor mild, we observe that one ﬁrm is relatively more eﬃcient than the other and it
optimally imposes lower distortions to less eﬃcient types. To sum up, eﬀort distortions are lower the
higher the degree of competition between the two ﬁrms.
Moreover, competition reduces the set of worker’s types that each ﬁrm can attract in equilibrium and
this implies that the two ﬁrms need not resort to pooling contracts. Indeed, pooling is less pervasive
for the mission-oriented ﬁrm than in the absence of competition. Our results on bidimensional screening
extend the analysis of a companion paper, Barigozzi and Burani (2013), in which we fully characterized
the optimal contracts oﬀered by a monopsonistic mission-oriented ﬁrm.
For a wide range of parameter conﬁgurations, we ﬁnd that a compensating wage diﬀerential emerges,
in that, the total salary gained by a motivated type of worker in the vocational sector is lower than
the salary that the same worker type would gain in the non-vocational sector. Such a wage penalty is
particularly striking because it is always associated with higher eﬀort provision on the part of motivated
workers employed in the vocational sector. In addition, for a larger set of parameter values we also
observe that equilibrium contracts oﬀered by the mission-oriented ﬁrm are characterized by lower power
of incentives than the ones designed by the standard ﬁrm; in diﬀerent words, it is almost always the case
that returns to skills are lower in the sector where motivation matters.
Interestingly, we are able to disentangle the eﬀect of motivation and ability on the wage gap by
observing that lower salaries in the vocational sector are driven by intrinsic motivation and not by
ability.2 However, ability does play a role in that the earnings penalty is increasing in ability. This result
is consistent with the empirical evidence on the public-private wage gap documented in Roomking and
Weisbrod (1999) and Bargain and Melly (2008), among others.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following subsection we describe the related
2Our discrete framework is particularly useful to study the wage diﬀerential because it allows us to compare the salary
received by workers with the same ability in diﬀerent sectors (with no need to recur to an average measure of ability in each
sector).
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literature. In Section 2, we set up the model; in Section 3, the eﬃcient solution is presented together with
the equilibrium under full information. Section 4 describes the equilibrium screening strategies of the two
principals when only one principal is able to hire all types of workers. In Section 5, the characterization of
the optimal contracts is provided when principals compete with each other and workers sort themselves
by motivation. Subsection 5.4 comments on the existence of wage penalties in the mission-oriented sector
and, ﬁnally, Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
Our work contributes to two diﬀerent strands of literature: from an economic point of view, it adds
to the recent and rapidly growing literature on the self-selection of workers with intrinsic motivation
into diﬀerent sectors of the labor market; from a technical point of view, it explicitly solves a multi-
principal game in a labor market where workers are characterized by two diﬀerent dimensions of private
information.
The problem of the design of optimal incentive schemes for intrinsically motivated workers has been
tackled by Murdock (2002), Besley and Gathak (2005), whose attention has primarily been devoted to
moral hazard, while we consider the screening problem.
Heyes (2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) are the ﬁrst papers that address the issue of the selection
of workers who are privately informed about their vocation. They show that, as a worker’s motivation in-
creases, the worker’s reservation wage decreases. Therefore, as the wage increases, the average motivation
of the workers who are willing to accept the job deteriorates.
Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) consider a richer framework where workers are heterogeneous with respect
to both their intrinsic motivation and their ability. They focus on the issue of managerial self-selection
into public vs private sectors under full information on the workers’ characteristics: they argue that
the return to managerial ability is always lower in the public than in the private sector, and that more
able managers self-select into the private sector. They conclude that attracting a more able managerial
workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration up to the private sector levels is not eﬃcient.
Our paper is also related to Handy and Katz (1998) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2008). The ﬁrst paper
shows that non-proﬁts attract motivated managers by oﬀering them compensation packages involving
lower money wages and a larger component of institution-speciﬁc fringe beneﬁts as compared to the private
sector. But this result is driven by an exogenously given ranking of reservation wages for the diﬀerent
types of managers. Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) consider optimal contracts oﬀered to civil servants who
diﬀer in laziness and public service motivation. They ﬁnd that a cost-minimizing government optimally
attracts dedicated as well as the laziest workers in the economy. We depart from this analysis in two
main respects: ﬁrst, their private sector is perfectly competitive and therefore ﬁrms do not interact
5
strategically. Second, their screening mechanism is simpliﬁed because the public agency is constrained to
hire at most two types of agents.3
More recently, Bénabou and Tirole (2013) analyze a model where ﬁrms compete to attract workers that
are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity and their work ethics, i.e. the extent to which agents
“do the right thing” beyond what their material self-interest commands. They show how competition
for the most productive workers can interact with the incentive structure inside ﬁrms to undermine
work ethics. The focus of Bénabou and Tirole (2013) is diﬀerent from ours: they study the eﬀects of
ﬁrms’ competition on the power of incentives schemes, we instead analyze the sorting of workers’ types
into mission-oriented and standard sectors. Moreover, they assume an aﬃne compensation scheme with
incentive power and a ﬁxed wage, we instead consider non-linear contracts. Finally, in their framework
with multitasking and moral hazard, screening is not bidimensional but it is performed by ﬁrms with
respect to one dimension at a time (either productivity or work ethics).
From a technical point of view our paper draws both from the literature on multidimensional screening
and from the literature on multi-principals. To the best of our knowledge, a model where both analyses
are simultaneously carried out has not been studied before.
Screening when agents have several unobservable characteristics have been analyzed by some impor-
tant papers that deal with continuous distribution of types: Armstrong and Rochet (1999), Armstrong
(1996), Rochet and Chonè (1998), Basov (2001, 2005) and Deneckere and Severinov (2011). They all show
that it is almost impossible to extend to the multidimensional environment the qualitative results and
the regularity conditions of the unidimensional case. Our model is characterized by a discrete type space,
and by one screening instrument available to the principal (namely the contractible eﬀort level) so that
the closest paper to ours is Armstrong (1999), which considers optimal price regulation of a monopoly
that is privately informed about both its cost and demand function.
In the multi-principal literature (see for instance Stole 1995) the paper most closely related to us
is Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1993) which studies two non-identical principals competing for the exclusive
services of an agent in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard. The two principals have
diﬀerent technologies in that one principal is more eﬃcient in hiring low skilled types while the other is
more eﬃcient in employing high skilled types. Intermediate types are the ones for whom competition is
harsher: both principals make zero proﬁts on these types, who get the same contract and are indiﬀerent
between working for either principal. Besides the diﬀerence between the continuous and the discrete setup,
we depart from this work because we consider bidimensional rather than unidimensional screening.
3Barigozzi et al. (2013) and Barigozzi and Turati (2012) consider labor supply in a market where workers have private
information on both productive ability and motivation. They show that the lemons’ problem might be exacerbated by the
presence of multidimensional asymmetric information because an increase in the market wage can determine a simultaneous
decrease in both average vocation and average productivity of applicants.
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2 The model
We consider a multi-principal setting with bidimensional adverse selection. We assume that the economy
is divided into two sectors, a non-vocational (or standard) sector, and a vocational (or mission-oriented)
sector. In each sector operates a principal (he) willing to hire one agent (she) to perform a given task.
The agent can work exclusively for one principal only. The principals and the agent are risk neutral.
Eﬀort supplied by the agent is the only input the two ﬁrms need in order to produce. We call e
the observable and measurable eﬀort (task) level that the agent is asked to provide.4 Both principals’
production functions display constant returns to eﬀort in such a way that
qP (e) = kP e,
where kP denotes the marginal productivity of eﬀort for principal P ∈ {V,NV }, with V referring to
the principal operating in the vocational-sector and NV referring to the non-vocational principal. We
normalize the marginal productivity of eﬀort for the mission-oriented principal to kV = 1 and set kNV =
k.5
The principals’ proﬁt functions are given by
πP (e) = qP (e)−wP = kP e−wP ,
where the price of output is assumed to be exogenous and normalized to 1 in both sectors, and where wP
is the salary paid to the worker hired by principal P . Since the principals’ proﬁt only indirectly depends
on the type of the agent, we are considering a setting with private values.
Suppose that the agent diﬀers in two characteristics, productive ability and intrinsic motivation, that
are independently and uniformly distributed.
We interpret worker’s characterized by high ability as an agent incurring in a low cost of providing a
given eﬀort level. Workers can have only two possible levels of cost of eﬀort provision θi ∈ {θL, θH} , where
θH > θL > 0. High ability corresponds to a low cost of eﬀort provision θL, low ability to a high cost of
eﬀort provision θH .
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As for intrinsic motivation, we mainly refer to Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) and assume that workers,
to a certain extent, derive utility from exerting eﬀort in the mission-oriented sector. Since there exists
a one-to-one relationship between eﬀort exerted and output produced by the vocational principal, this
4 In particular, the variable e can be interpreted as a job-speciﬁc requirement like the amount of hours of labor the agent
is asked to devote to production or the speed at which a production line is run in a factory.
5For the time being, we do not impose any constraints on the magnitude of kNV , which can be smaller or greater than
kV .
6Note that, as usual, modelling one worker who can take four possible types with equal probability is equivalent to
considering a unit mass set of workers divided into four diﬀerent groups of types with the same frequency.
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interpretation is equivalent to considering intrinsic motivation as the enjoyment of one’s personal contri-
bution to the vocational principal’s output.7 What matters is that the beneﬁt from intrinsic motivation
can only be enjoyed when a motivated worker is employed in the vocational sector. In diﬀerent words,
ability is the only relevant worker’s characteristic in the non-vocational sector. Paralleling ability, we
assume that motivation can take only two possible values γj ∈ {γL, γH} . A worker can have either high
motivation γH , or low motivation γL.
So there are four types of agents denoted as ij = {LH,LL,HH,HL} where the ﬁrst index represents
the cost of eﬀort provision and the second motivation.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the lower bounds of the support of the distribution for both
attributes, setting θL = 1 and γL = 0. We will thus focus on situations in which the agent can be either
intrinsically motivated, with motivation parameter taking value γH = γ or not motivated at all. Our
results will depend on how the diﬀerence or heterogeneity in motivation ∆γ = γH − γL = γ relates to
the diﬀerence in ability ∆θ = θH − θL = θ− 1. Given our normalization, we will refer to the diﬀerence in
motivation ∆γ and to the level of motivation γ interchangeably. Furthermore, we impose that ∆γ ≤ 1
or else that 0 < γ ≤ 1 and that ∆θ ≤ 1 or else that 1 < θ ≤ 2 (these assumptions are made in order to
avoid volunteer work and to allow low-skilled, motivated workers to be more productive than high-skilled,
non-motivated agents at the ﬁrst best, respectively).
The agent’s reservation utility is endogenous and depends on the contract oﬀered by the opponent
principal. We assume that, if the worker is not hired by any principal, her utility is zero.
When a worker is hired by the non-vocational principal, her utility is
UNVij = wij −
1
2
θie
2
ij .
In fact, motivated workers do not enjoy any beneﬁt from motivation when hired by the standard ﬁrm.
As a consequence, from the point of view of the non-vocational principal, workers LH and LL on one
side and workers HH and HL on the other side are equally productive.8
The single crossing condition is obviously always veriﬁed with respect to the ability parameter in the
non-vocational sector because MRSNVe,w = − ∂U
NV
ij /∂eij
∂UNVij /∂wij
= θieij and
∂MRSNVe,w
∂θi
> 0.
When a worker is hired by the vocational principal, her utility takes the form
UVij = wij −
1
2
θie
2
ij + γjeij ,
7The same interpretation of intrinsic motivation can be found in Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur
(2007, 2008, 2010-only as for Section 5) and traces back to the “warm-glow giving” or impure altruism theory in Andreoni
(1990).
8However, types of agent with the same ability potentially beneﬁt from diﬀerent outside options. In fact, given ability,
motivated workers are more productive than non-motivated ones when employed by the vocational principal. In diﬀerent
words, intrinsic motivation aﬀects the reservation utility but not the productivity of workers when they are employed in
the non-vocational sector.
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where both productivity θi and motivation γj are related to eﬀort exertion.
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The marginal rate of substitution between eﬀort and wage is given by
MRSVe,w = −
∂UVij /∂eij
∂UVij /∂wij
= θieij − γj ,
which is always positive for non-motivated workers with γj = 0. When the eﬀort required by the
principal is suﬃciently high, i.e. when eij >
γj
θi
, also motivated workers’ indiﬀerence curves have the
standard positive slope in the space (e,w) and eﬀort is a “bad”.
Note that providing eﬀort represents a net cost to the agent when
−1
2
θie
2
ij + γjeij < 0.
Thus, if the eﬀort required by the mission-oriented principal is suﬃciently low, motivated workers could
perform their task when receiving a non-positive reward, in other words they would be ready to volunteer
to be hired in the mission-oriented sector.
Finally, notice that agents’ utility function satisﬁes the single-crossing property, but only with respect
to each parameter of private information at a time.10 This means that the indiﬀerence curves of types
with the same motivation but diﬀerent ability intersect only once at e = 0, and the same is true for the
indiﬀerence curves of workers endowed with the same ability but diﬀerent motivation. Nonetheless, the
indiﬀerence curves of intermediate types HH and LL cross twice, the second intersection occurring at
e = 2γθ−1 .
Remark 1 In the mission-oriented sector, the single-crossing property does not hold.
In the mission-oriented sector, the combined impact of both ability and motivation on the worker’s
eﬀort and on the ﬁrm’s output is as follows: the most productive type is worker LH (with low eﬀort cost
and high motivation) who is expected to exert the highest eﬀort, whereas the least productive type is
worker HL (with high eﬀort cost and no motivation) who is expected to provide the lowest eﬀort. Worker
types LL and HH are in-between and their eﬀort levels cannot be ordered unambiguously.11
9This linear-quadratic speciﬁcation of the utility function is widely used in the literature on workers’ intrinsic motivation
(see Besley and Ghatak 2005 and Delfgaauw and Dur 2010). The same objective function for the agent is also considered in
the literature on multidimensional screening with a continuum of types (see Laﬀont et al. 1987, Basov 2005, and Deneckere
and Severinov 2011), where solutions are found imposing that the type space be the unit square.
10All the properties of the utility function extend to the more general case in which the cost of eﬀort is still convex while
the beneﬁt from exerting eﬀort, due to intrinsic motivation, is concave.
11Notice that the existence of two possible orderings of eﬀort levels is a consequence of the bidimensionality of our problem
and of the failure of the single-crossing condition. It could not be generated in a unidimensional set-up with diﬀerent types
of employees characterized by a single summary statistic, like the overall cost of providing eﬀort.
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The timing of the game is as follows. The two principals simultaneously oﬀer the worker a menu of
contracts of the form

ePij , w
P (eij)

, with P ∈ {V,NV }. The worker observes the contracts, chooses
which principal (if any) to work for and selects a contract. Then the worker exerts the eﬀort level speciﬁed
by the chosen contract, output is produced and the contracted wage is paid.
An equilibrium is such that each principal chooses a menu of contracts that maximizes his expected
proﬁt, given the contracts oﬀered by the rival principal and given the equilibrium choice of the worker.
The worker chooses the contract that maximizes her utility. The principals are bound to oﬀer contracts
that make non-negative proﬁt. If a worker is indiﬀerent between working for the two principals, it is
assumed that with probability one such worker will choose to work for the principal making the higher
proﬁt. In fact the principal with the higher payoﬀ is able to raise her reward by ε > 0 and break the tie.
In Section 5 we will study competition with (bidimensional) adverse selection. Before turning to the
second-best with competition, let us examine some benchmark cases.
3 Benchmark cases
In this section we illustrate the ﬁrst-best of the model and the equilibrium under full information.
3.1 The social planner
Suppose that a social planner, endowed with perfect information about the applicant’s characteristics,
maximizes total surplus by assigning types of worker to principals. The ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels are obtained
by maximizing total surplus (sum of the agent’s utility and the principal’s proﬁt) with respect to the
workers’ eﬀort for each type of worker and for each type of principal and are as follows
eFB,VLH = 1 + γ e
FB,V
HH =
1+γ
θ e
FB,V
LL = 1 e
FB,V
HL =
1
θ (1)
for the vocational principal and
eFB,NVLH = e
FB,NV
LL = e
FB,NV
L· = k e
FB,NV
HH = e
FB,NV
HL = e
FB,NV
H· =
k
θ (2)
for the non-vocational principal.
When 1 < k < 1 + γ, the social planner assigns motivated workers to the vocational principal and
non-motivated types of worker to the non-vocational principal. The labor market is fully segmented
according to motivation, and workers’ ability is evenly distributed across sectors.
When k = 1, the two principals are equally productive in hiring non-motivated workers LL and HL
but principal V is more productive when employing motivated types HH and LH, so that the vocational
principal alone can guarantee eﬃciency.
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When k = 1 + γ, instead, the two principals are equally productive in hiring motivated workers
LH and HH and principal NV is more productive than the vocational principal when employing non-
motivated types LL and HL, so that the non-vocational principal alone might eﬃciently hire all worker’s
types. Note that, for k < 1, eﬃciency would require that the vocational principal is the unique employer,
whereas for k > 1 + γ eﬃciency would require that the non-vocational principal is the unique employer.
3.2 Competition under full information
Here the two principals observe the worker’s type and simultaneously oﬀer her a contract

ePij , w
P
ij

,
with P ∈ {V,NV } . The best strategy is to ask each agent the ﬁrst best eﬀort level: this allows the
two principals to generate the highest revenue to be used to attract the worker (notice that the game
describes a situation where two ﬁrms characterized by diﬀerent eﬃciency levels compete à la Bertrand to
attract a worker of known type).
The association of types to principals is the eﬃcient one described in the previous subsection. When
1 < k < 1 + γ, the standard ﬁrm will make its highest oﬀer to motivated workers, that is the ﬁrst best
total surplus (see expression 3 below for the wage that a worker receives when she is rewarded the ﬁrst
best total surplus) and the mission-oriented ﬁrm will meet that oﬀer attracting motivated workers.12 In
the same way and in the case of non-motivated workers, the mission-oriented ﬁrm will oﬀer the ﬁrst best
total surplus and, the standard ﬁrm will meet that oﬀer attracting the two worker’s types.
When k ≤ 1 and k ≥ 1 + γ the more productive principal is hiring all the workers.
In Appendix B we compute the wages oﬀered by the two principals in equilibrium, we further discuss
the cases with k = 1 and k = 1 + γ and, summarize the properties of the allocation.
4 Fully dominant principals
We start tackling the issue of competition between the two non-informed principals in the extreme cases
in which, in equilibrium, all worker’s types are hired by one principal and the other principal remains
inactive. Following Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1993), we call such situations of “deterred competition”
equilibria with a fully dominant principal.
When a principal is fully dominant, he is able to hire all types of workers and to make non-negative
proﬁts on all types, even when the rival principal, who is called the dominated principal, oﬀers them
their ﬁrst best total surplus. To be more precise, suppose that principal P ∈ {V,NV } is the dominated
principal. Then he unsuccessfully competes with the dominant principal by oﬀering each type of worker
a contract such that: (i) the eﬀort level is the ﬁrst-best eﬀort eFB,Pij , and (ii) the total wage is obtained
12Notice that any lower wage possibly oﬀered by the less eﬃcient principal would generate proﬁtable deviations and thus
cannot be an equilibrium strategy.
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imposing zero proﬁts on that type, i.e.
πPij = k
P eFB,Pij −wPij = 0⇐⇒ wPij = kP eFB,Pij . (3)
In this way, the dominated principal oﬀers each type of agent the maximal possible utility that he can,
which is given by
UTS,Pij = k
P eFB,Pij −
1
2
θie
FB,P
ij + γje
FB,P
ij , (4)
where the superscript TS stands for total surplus utility and where the term γje
FB,P
ij is equal to zero when
the dominated principal is the non-vocational one. Conversely, the fully dominant principal succeeds in
attracting all types of worker by oﬀering them at least UTS,Pij .
Intuitively, a principal is fully dominant when he is much more “productive” than the other, where
by “productive” we mean the combination of marginal productivity of eﬀort and intrinsic motivation and
their joint eﬀect on eﬀort and output provision.
4.1 Fully dominant non-vocational principal
Recall that the non-vocational principal is only able to screen applicants on the basis of their ability and
that intrinsic motivation does not play any role for the design of the optimal incentive scheme. In other
words, any incentive compatible contract that the non-vocational principal might oﬀer must be such that
workers with the same ability are oﬀered the same contract, whereby
eNVLH = e
NV
LL = e
NV
L· and e
NV
HH = e
NV
HL = e
NV
H·
and
wNVLH = w
NV
LL = w
NV
L· and w
NV
HH = w
NV
HL = w
NV
H·
But types characterized by the same ability and diﬀerent intrinsic motivation are not completely identical
to the non-vocational principal, because they enjoy diﬀerent outside options or reservation utilities.
Indeed, when the non-vocational principal is fully dominant, the workers’ outside options are equal to
their ﬁrst best total surplus in the mission-oriented sector and given by
UTS,VLH =
(1+γ)2
2 U
TS,V
HH =
(1+γ)2
2θ U
TS,V
LL =
1
2 U
TS,V
HL =
1
2θ
(5)
Note that UTS,VLH > U
TS,V
LL and that U
TS,V
HH > U
TS,V
HL , namely that the vocational principal is always able
to leave to motivated types a strictly higher utility than to non-motivated types with the same ability.
Then, the fully dominant non-vocational principal’s program is
max(eNVi· ,wNVi· )E

πNV

= 12 [

keNVL· −wNVL·

+

keNVH· −wNVH·

] (PNV FD)
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subject to the two participation constraints of motivated types13
wNVi· −
1
2
θi

eNVi·
2 ≥ UTS,ViH (PCNViH )
for every i = L,H and two incentive compatibility constraints
wNVi· −
1
2
θi

eNVi·
2 ≥ wNVi′· − 12θi eNVi′· 2 (ICNVi·vsi′·)
for every i = L,H and i′ 	= i. Adding the two incentive compatibility constraints, one can easily check
that implementability requires that
eNVLH = e
NV
LL = e
NV
L· > e
NV
HH = e
NV
HL = e
NV
H·
In order to solve problem PNV FD, we build on the analysis of Martimort and Laﬀont (2002, Chap-
ter 3.3, pages 101-105) which is devoted to the study of type-dependent participation constraints and
countervailing incentives when there are only two types of agent and the ineﬃcient type’s outside option
is zero while the eﬃcient type’s reservation utility is positive. As in Martimort and Laﬀont (2002), the
solution exhibits ﬁve diﬀerent regimes according to which participation and incentive compatibility con-
straints are binding. In turn, diﬀerent constraints might be binding in our setup depending on how the
diﬀerence in reservation utilities UTS,VLH − UTS,VHH relates to the optimal eﬀort levels associated to each
regime (which are a function of the marginal productivity of eﬀort in the non-vocational sector k).
Case 1 (Irrelevance of outside options) This case occurs when PCNVHH and IC
NV
L·vsH· are binding.
In terms of eﬀort levels, the solution is such that eSB,NVH· =
k
(2θ−1) and e
SB,NV
L· = k = e
FB,NV
L· .
Thus the second-best solution remains valid despite the type-dependent outside options. This case
is relevant when UTS,VLH − UTS,VHH < (θ−1)2

eSB,NVH·
2
= (θ−1)k
2
2(2θ−1)2 .
Case 2 This case occurs when both PCNVHH and PC
NV
LH and also IC
NV
L·vsH· are binding. The solution is
such that e∗,NVH· =

2(UTS,VLH −U
TS,V
HH )
θ−1 (which is in-between the second- and the ﬁrst-best level) and
eFB,NVL· = k. This case is relevant when
(θ−1)
2

eSB,NVH·
2
≤ UTS,VLH − UTS,VHH < (θ−1)2

eFB,NVH·
2
=
(θ−1)k2
2θ2
.
Case 3 This case occurs when only PCNVHH and PC
NV
LH are binding. The solution is the ﬁrst-best one,
that is eFB,NVH· =
k
θ and e
FB,NV
L· = k. This case is relevant when
(θ−1)
2

eFB,NVH·
2
≤ UTS,VLH −
UTS,VHH <
(θ−1)
2

eFB,NVL·
2
= (θ−1)k
2
2 .
Case 4 This case occurs when both PCNVHH and PC
NV
LH and IC
NV
H·vsL· are binding. The solution is
such that eFB,NVH· =
k
θ and e
∗,NV
L· =

2(UTS,VLH −U
TS,V
HH )
θ−1 (which is in-between the ﬁrst-best level and
13Given the magnitudes of UTS,Vij , only the participation constraints of motivated types matter. Indeed, once PC
NV
LH is
satisﬁed, then PCNVLL is slack and, similarly, once PC
NV
HH holds, then also PC
NV
HL is satisﬁed with strict inequality.
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the countervailing incentives solution eCI,NVL· deﬁned in the last case). This case is relevant when
(θ−1)
2

eFB,NVL·
2
≤ UTS,VLH − UTS,VHH ≤ (θ−1)2

eCI,NVL·
2
= (θ−1)k
2
2(2−θ)2 .
Case 5 (Countervailing Incentives) This case occurs when PCNVLH and IC
NV
H·vsL· are binding. The
solution is such that eFB,NVH· =
k
θ and e
CI,NV
L· =
k
(2−θ) (which is above both the ﬁrst-best level and
e∗,NVL· ). This case is relevant when U
TS,V
LH − UTS,VHH ≥ (θ−1)2

eCI,NVL·
2
.
Since the diﬀerence in reservation utilities is ﬁxed and equal to UTS,VLH −UTS,VHH = (θ−1)(1+γ)
2
2θ , straight-
forward computations show that the only possible situations in which the non-vocational principal is fully
dominant are Cases from 1 to 3.
In particular, Case 1 holds for k > (1+γ)(2θ−1)√
θ
= k1, Case 2 holds for k2 = (1 + γ)
√
θ < k ≤ k1
and Case 3 holds for k3 =
1+γ√
θ
< k ≤ k2, where k1 > k2 > 1 + γ > k3. But when k < 1 + γ the non-
vocational principal makes strictly negative proﬁts. Hence, Case 3 is only relevant for 1 + γ ≤ k ≤ k2,
while the remaining regimes 4 and 5, which are associated with even lower levels of k and with strictly
negative proﬁts, must be discarded. This fact implies that the non-vocational principal never resorts to
countervailing incentives.
Also notice that, when k = 1+γ, the non-vocational principal is in Case 3 and is able to hire all types
of workers oﬀering precisely the same contracts as the rival principal. Thus the non-vocational principal
makes zero proﬁts on all types, and the latter are indiﬀerent between the two sectors. Such a situation
cannot be an equilibrium because the non-vocational principal can proﬁtably deviate by attracting all
types except type HH, who strictly prefers the contract oﬀered by the mission-oriented ﬁrm. When
k = 1 + γ, Section 5.3 shows that the equilibrium is such that workers sort themselves by motivation
and the non-vocational principal only hires non-motivated types making strictly positive proﬁts on each
potential applicant.
The above discussion can be summarized in the Proposition that follows.
Proposition 1 The non-vocational principal is fully dominant if k > 1 + γ.
4.2 Fully dominant vocational principal
When principal V fully dominates, the equilibrium strategy of principal NV is to make the agent the
residual claimant so that she receives all the surplus. Therefore each type is asked to provide the ﬁrst-best
level of eﬀort and the non-vocational principal makes zero proﬁts on each type, who is left with her total
surplus utility
UTS,NVL· =
k2
2
or UTS,NVH· =
k2
2θ
.
Note that such utilities only diﬀer according to ability.
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Now, the vocational principal must oﬀer each type of agent a level of utility at least as high as UTS,NVi·
for i = L,H. Thus the vocational principal solves the maximization problem
max(eVij ,wVij)E

πV

= 14 [

eVLH −wVLH

+

eVLL −wVLL

+

eVHH −wVHH

+

eVHL −wVHL

] (PV FD)
subject to four participation constraints whose generic form is
wij − 1
2
θi

eVij
2
+ γje
V
ij ≥ UTS,NVi· (PCVij )
and twelve incentive compatibility constraints that are such that
wVij −
1
2
θi

eVij
2
+ γje
V
ij ≥ wVi′j′ −
1
2
θi

eVi′j′
2
+ γje
V
i′j′ (IC
V
ijvsi′j′)
with ij diﬀerent from i′j′.
The solution to this program is found extending the analysis of a companion paper, Barigozzi and Bu-
rani (2013), where the problem of bidimensional screening is considered for type-independent reservation
utilities (normalized to zero) and for a non-uniform distribution of the worker’s types.
Note that PCVHH is slack once IC
V
HHvsHL and PC
V
HL are both satisﬁed: indeed, the following chain
of inequalities holds
wVHH −
1
2
θ

eVHH
2
+ γeVHH ≥ wVHL −
1
2
θ

eVHL
2
+ γeVHL 	
 
ICVHHvsHL
> wVHL −
1
2
θ

eVHL
2 ≥ k2
2θ 	
 
PCVHL
implying that
wVHH −
1
2
θ

eVHH
2
+ γeVHH >
k2
2θ
,
which is precisely PCVHH holding with strict inequality. Similarly, PC
V
LH is slack once IC
V
LHvsLL and
PCVLL both hold because
wVLH −
1
2

eVLH
2
+ γeVLH ≥ wVLL −
1
2

eVLL
2
+ γeVLL 	
 
ICV
LHvsLL
> wVLL −
1
2

eVHL
2 ≥ k2
2 	
 
PCV
LL
.
So one can consider a reduced program where the participation constraints of motivated types PCVLH
and PCVHH are omitted.
Finally, concerning PCVLL and PC
V
HL, one can write
wVLL −
1
2

eVLL
2 ≥ wVHL − 12 eVHL2 	
 
ICV
LLvsHL
> wVHL −
1
2
θ

eVHL
2 ≥ k2
2θ 	
 
PCV
HL
.
In order for PCVLL to be satisﬁed when PC
V
HL is, assume ﬁrst that PC
V
HL is binding and then substitute
the corresponding expression for wVHL into the right hand side of IC
V
LLvsHL. Then PC
V
LL will be slack
whenever
wVLL −
1
2

eVLL
2 ≥ 1
2
(θ − 1) eVHL2 + k22θ > k
2
2
,
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a necessary condition being (considering the last inequality) eVHL >
k√
θ
. But note that eFB,VHL =
1
θ and it
has to be that eFB,VHL ≥ k√θ or else that k ≤
1√
θ
< 1. So the marginal productivity of labor in the non-
vocational sector k must be suﬃciently low in order for PCVLL to be omitted from the program (because
it is implied by PCVHL); otherwise both PC
V
LL and PC
V
HL might be relevant.
Moreover, adding the incentive compatibility constraints two by two, the following implementability
condition holds
eVLH > max

eVLL; e
V
HH
 ≥ mineVLL; eVHH > eVHL.
Concerning intermediate types, one has either eVLL = e
V
HH or
eVHH > e
V
LL and e
V
LL + e
V
HH ≤
2γ
∆θ
, (6)
or
eVLL > e
V
HH and e
V
LL + e
V
HH ≥
2γ
∆θ
. (7)
In words, if motivation has a higher impact on eﬀort and output provision than ability (i.e. condition 6 is
satisﬁed), then from the principal’s viewpoint, types can be ordered as LH ≻ HH ≻ LL ≻ LH. We call
this instance motivation prevails (Case M). If, instead, ability has a higher impact on eﬀort and output
provision than motivation (i.e. condition 7 is satisﬁed), then from the principal’s viewpoint, types can
be ordered as LH ≻ LL ≻ HH ≻ LH. We call this situation ability prevails (Case A). Finally, when
neither ability nor motivation prevail, it becomes impossible for the principal to separate intermediate
types and a pooling contract for types HH and LL is the solution to problem PV FD.
We omit here a detailed description of the equilibrium contracts that solve program PV FD because
it is beyond the scope of the present analysis. As said, optimal contracts can be found by extending the
results in Barigozzi and Burani (2013) so as to allow for participation constraint PCVLL to be binding
(rather than considering PCVHL only).
14 We only state a result that parallels the one obtained in the
preceding Section 4.1.
Proposition 2 The vocational principal is fully dominant if k < 1.
When k = 1, the mission-oriented principal is indiﬀerent between hiring all types of workers or hiring
only motivated types, and non-motivated types are indiﬀerent between accepting the contracts oﬀered
by the non-vocational principal or the contracts oﬀered by the vocational rival. We refer the reader to
Section 5.3 (and to Situation (ii) with PNV in Case 3, in particular) for a description of this alternative
situation.
14The complete solution to program PV FD is available upon request.
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5 Competing principals
Suppose that 1 ≤ k ≤ 1+γ, whereby neither principal fully dominates and both principals truly compete
for the exclusive services of the agent. The two principals simultaneously oﬀer the worker the choice of
a menu of screening contracts.
Now it is immediate to see that principal V has an advantage in hiring motivated types LH and HH
while principal NV has an incentive in attracting non-motivated types LL and HL. In other words, the
mission-oriented principal is still dominant but only with respect to the set of motivated types, whereas
the non-vocational principal is dominant with respect to the set of non-motivated types.
In equilibrium, we expect the principal, who is dominant relatively to a given set of types, to hire
these types and to oﬀer to the remaining types out-of-equilibrium contracts that will never be accepted.
5.1 The non-vocational principal
As for principal NV, it is again true that any incentive compatible contracts must be such that workers
with the same skills are required to exert the same eﬀort, eNViH = e
NV
iL = e
NV
i· , receive the same wage,
wNViH = w
NV
iL = w
NV
i· and enjoy the same utility U
NV
iH = U
NV
iL = U
NV
i· , for i = L,H, irrespective of their
(potential) intrinsic motivation.
Moreover, the non-vocational principal is dominated with respect to motivated workers, so he antici-
pates that in equilibrium he is going to attract non-motivated types only. Thus, he designs his contracts
uniquely considering the outside options of non-motivated workers. In other words, in order to succeed
in hiring non-motivated types LL and HL, principal NV must be able to leave them at least UVLL and
UVHL, respectively. Such reservation utilities are endogenous but, because of the simultaneity of moves,
are taken as given by principal NV.
Then, the non-vocational principal’s program is now
max(eNVi· ,wNVi· )E

πNV

= 12 [

keNVL· −wNVL·

+

keNVH· −wNVH·

] (PNV C)
subject to the two participation constraints of non-motivated types
wNVi· −
1
2
θi

eNVi·
2 ≥ UViL (PCNViL )
for every i = L,H and two incentive compatibility constraints
wNVi· −
1
2
θi

eNVi·
2 ≥ wNVi′· − 12θi eNVi′· 2 (ICNVi·vsi′·)
for every i = L,H and i′ 	= i.
One can replicate the analysis which has been carried out in Section 4.1, substituting the total surplus
utilities UTS,VLH − UTS,VHH with UVLL − UVHL and, accordingly, substituting the participation constraints
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PCNVLH and PC
NV
HH with PC
NV
LL and PC
NV
HL , respectively. The ﬁve diﬀerent regimes are still in place and
so are the optimal eﬀort levels associated with each regime. Figure 1 represents the reaction function of
principal NV who is interested in hiring non-motivated types only.
Insert Figure 1 around here
Notice that, when PCNViL is binding for the type with eﬀort cost i = L,H, then it must necessarily be
the case that PCViL is binding as well. In other words, U
NV
iH = U
NV
iL = U
V
iL and type iL is indiﬀerent
between working in either sector (the tie-breaking rule mentioned at the end of Section 2 might then
apply). Conversely, when PCNViL is slack, then it must be the case that U
NV
iL > U
V
iL and that type iL
strictly prefers to work in the standard sector rather than in the mission-oriented sector.
5.2 The vocational principal
Diﬀerently from the non-vocational principal, the mission-oriented principal oﬀers four contracts when
possible: worker ij exerts eﬀort eVij , receives a wage w
V
ij and enjoys utility U
V
ij . In equilibrium, principal
V will hire motivated agents only but will oﬀer out-of-equilibrium contracts to non-motivated types so
as to satisfy internal incentive compatibility.
In order to solve principal’s V program, we start by taking as given each one of the possible ﬁve
regimes in which principal NV can ﬁnd himself. This allows to single out which participation constraint
between PCNVLL and PC
NV
HL is binding. When PC
NV
iL , with i = L,H, is binding, it means that PC
V
iL is
binding as well and that type iL is indiﬀerent between the two principals. Then the dominated principal
V will oﬀer this type her ﬁrst best total surplus and make zero proﬁts from that type. In fact, any
other strategy would create the opportunity for proﬁtable deviations by the competitor. In particular,
if PCLL is binding, then UNVLL = U
TS,V
LL =
1
2 and the mission-oriented ﬁrm obtains zero proﬁt on the
out-of-equilibrium contract for worker LL. In the same way, if PCHL is binding then U
NV
HL = U
TS,V
HL =
1
2θ
and the mission-oriented principal earns zero proﬁt from worker HL.15
For the sake of concreteness, let us suppose that the non-vocational principal is in the situation
where irrelevance of outside options holds (Case 1 in Figure 1). Then PCNVLL is slack while PC
NV
HL is
binding. Thus, we can study a program for the mission-oriented principal which is similar to PV FD,
but which is such that PCVLL is slack and PC
V
HL is binding, whereby the contract oﬀered to type HL
satisﬁes eVHL = e
FB,V
HL =
1
θ = w
V
HL and U
V
HL = U
TS,V
HL =
1
2θ . The solution will clearly depend on whether
motivation or ability prevails, that is on whether condition (6) or condition (7) holds or none. In case of
15Note that, because of competition, the mission-oriented principal reaches internal incentive compatibility at a higher
cost than when he does not face any rival principal. In particular, by increasing (with respect to the monopsony case with
zero outside options for all types) the utility that non-motivated workers obtain out of equilibrium, the vocational principal
must pay larger information rents to motivated workers.
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multiple solutions, we take the one guaranteeing the highest proﬁts to principal V. Once the bidimensional
screening problem of the mission-oriented principal is solved, the utility UVLL is also well deﬁned so that
the value UVLL − UTS,VHL which enters the solution of program PNV C is fully determined. The last step
consists in checking whether the diﬀerence UVLL − UTS,VHL that has been found solving the vocational
principal’s program is compatible with the bounds which deﬁne Case 1 for principal NV. If yes, then the
solution obtained is an equilibrium, otherwise it must be discarded. We repeat the same procedure for
all the other regimes for principal NV , from 2 to 5.
Notably, the diﬀerence in reservation utilities UVLL − UVHL is never too big so as to yield Cases 4 and
5. Therefore, countervailing incentives are never observed at equilibrium.
This analysis is relegated to Appendix C.16
5.3 Sorting according to motivation
In what follows, we characterize the optimal incentive schemes oﬀered by the two competing principals
when 1 ≤ k ≤ 1 + γ and when workers optimally sort themselves by motivation, with motivated types
LH and HH choosing to be employed in the mission-oriented sector and non-motivated types LL and
HL being hired in the standard sector.
Diﬀerent situations emerge according to the magnitude of k, which governs principal NV ’s regimes,
and of γ and θ, that inﬂuence the states of the world for principal V. In what follows we refer to “second
best” eﬀort levels and contracts as the eﬀorts and contracts that are designed by a monopsonist hiring
workers with zero outside options.
Situation (i) When k and γ are both high, i.e. when k = (2θ−1)θ ≤ k ≤ 1 + γ and γ = (θ−1)θ ≤ γ < 1,
then the optimal incentive schemes are unique:
PNV is always in Case 1 (irrelevance of outside options) and oﬀers the second-best contracts with
eNVLH = e
NV
LL = k and e
NV
HH = e
NV
HL =
k
(2θ−1) .
PV motivation always prevails: employed types LH and HH are required to make eﬀorts eFB,VLH =
1 + γ and eSB,VHH =
1+γ
(2θ−1) , types LL and HL are oﬀered out-of-equilibrium pooling contracts
with eﬀort eVLL = e
V
HL =
1
θ , respectively.
Situation (ii) When k is such that 1 ≤ k ≤ k, then the optimal incentive schemes are not unique:
PNV • when 1 ≤ k < k = √θ principal NV is in Case 3 and oﬀers the ﬁrst best contracts to
all workers with eﬀorts eFB,NVLH = e
FB,NV
LL = k and e
FB,NV
HH = e
FB,NV
HL =
k
θ ,
16There, it is shown that the diﬀerence in reservation utilities UV
LL
− UV
HL
is never too big so as to yield Cases 4 and 5.
19
• when k ≤ k < k principal NV is in Case 2 and requires optimal eﬀort levels eFB,NVLH =
eFB,NVLL = k and e
∗,NV
HH = e
∗,NV
HL =
1√
θ
.
PV • when 0 < γ < γA = (θ − 1) , ability prevails (CaseA), motivated types are asked to provide
ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels eFB,VLH = 1+γ and e
FB,V
HH =
1+γ
θ and non-motivated types are oﬀered
out-of-equilibrium contracts with ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels eFB,VHL =
1
θ and e
FB,V
LL = 1 and all
the surplus.
• for γA ≤ γ ≤ γM = 2 (θ − 1), neither ability nor motivation prevail, intermediate types’
eﬀort levels are pooled and the ﬁrst-best total surplus is oﬀered out-of-equilibrium to
non-motivated types, whereby eFB,VLH = 1 + γ, e
V
HH = e
FB,V
LL = 1 and e
FB,V
HL =
1
θ .
• for γM < γ ≤ 1 and θ < 32 (ensuring that γM < 1), motivation prevails (Case M),
motivated types are required to provide eﬀort levels eFB,VLH = 1+γ and e
SB,V
HH =
1+γ
2θ−1 and
non-motivated types are oﬀered out-of-equilibrium the ﬁrst-best total surplus, whereby
eFB,VHL =
1
θ and e
FB,V
LL = 1.
As said, a more detailed discussion of the above results, is provided in Appendix C.
It can be checked that, given ability, motivated types who are all hired in the mission oriented sector
provide higher eﬀort than non-motivated types who are all hired in the standard sector, except for low-
ability types in Situation (ii) when motivation prevails for PV and PNV is in Case 3.
Figure 2 illustrates Situation (i) and Situation (ii) from the vocational principal’s point of view,
that is according to the relative magnitudes of γ and θ, the parameters representing the agent’s private
information.
Insert Figure 2 around here
The propositions that follows summarize what we have found so far.
Proposition 3 If 1 ≤ k ≤ 1 + γ, the sorting of workers types is eﬃcient. All motivated types choose
to work for the vocational principal and all non-motivated types choose to work for the non-vocational
principal.
Corollary 1 Workers’ self-selection is ability-neutral since average ability is identical across sectors.
The latter result would diﬀer when the distribution of types is not uniform and independent: it is
possible to verify that, if ability and intrinsic motivation are negatively correlated, then workers again
self-select according to motivation but average ability is lower in the vocational sector relative to the
non-vocational one.
As mentioned at the end of Section 4.1, when k = 1+γ the equilibrium is the one described in Situation
(i) and it can be shown that the non-vocational principal does not have any incentive to deviate neither
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by trying to hire all types of workers, nor by trying to employ all types of workers except HH, nor by
trying to employ all potential applicants except type LH.
We further propose a taxonomy of the above-mentioned equilibria with respect to the degree of
competition between principals, which in turn depends on whether principals are suﬃciently diﬀerent in
both technology and in the impact of the workers’ motivation.
Proposition 4 In both sectors, eﬀort provided by high-ability workers at equilibrium is not distorted.
Moreover:
• If competition is mild, i.e. if both k and γ are high, then both principals ask low-ability hired workers
to provide the second-best eﬀort levels (see Situation (i)).
• If competition is harsh, i.e. if both k and γ are low, then both principals ask low-ability hired workers
to provide ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels (see Situation (ii) with Case 3 for PNV and Case A for PV ).
• Otherwise, i.e. if k is high and γ is low or vice-versa, then the principal who is relatively more
eﬃcient asks low-ability hired worker to provide an eﬀort level which is in-between ﬁrst- and second-
best, while the other principal requires ﬁrst-best eﬀorts.
The intuition behind these results is the following. When competition is mild, because principals are
suﬃciently diﬀerentiated from each other, then outside options are not particularly relevant and internal
incentive compatibility is the driving force in determining equilibrium eﬀorts for hired workers, which
are the same as under monopsony. Conversely, when competition is harsh, because principals are similar
to each other, then outside options are the determinant of equilibrium eﬀorts for hired workers, while
internal incentive compatibility plays a minor role. This outcome is the one that most resembles the full
information equilibrium corresponding to Bertrand competition with each ﬁrm requiring ﬁrst-best eﬀort
levels and oﬀering wages such that the best oﬀer of the competitor is met. Also note that this outcome
is the one satisfying the so called separation property whereby competition among principals only aﬀects
the agents’ compensation schemes but not the optimal eﬀort levels (see Biglaiser and Mezzetti 2000, and
the references therein). In-between these polar degrees of competition, there are instances in which one
principal is relatively more eﬃcient than the other (namely PV when γ is high and k is low or PNV when
k is high and γ is low); for such a principal the separation property does not hold, since distortions in
the agents’ eﬀort levels are reduced with respect to the second-best contracts. When these intermediate
degrees of competition occur, then the less eﬃcient principal asks for the ﬁrst best eﬀort levels in and
out of equilibrium.
We can conclude that distortions in eﬀort provision are always decreasing with the level of competition
and, in case of intermediate degrees of competition, only the principal who is relatively more eﬃcient
implements screening contracts in equilibrium.
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that competition between principals never leads to countervailing
incentives, namely upward distortions in eﬀort levels never occur.
5.4 Market segmentation, wage diﬀerentials and the power of incentives
In this section we compare the wage schemes oﬀered in the two sectors of the labor market. In particular, it
is interesting to consider the model’s predictions as for the wage diﬀerential, if any, between the vocational
sector and the standard one. Thus, we ﬁrst compare the wage rate oﬀered by the two principals to
motivated and non-motivated workers, ﬁxing the level of ability. Then, we consider the return to ability
to verify whether and under which conditions the mission-oriented sector is characterized by lower power
of incentives, as some authors suggested (see, as an example, Handy and Katz 1998 and Besley and
Gathak 2005). All results in this section are derived in Appendix D.
For a wide range of parameter conﬁgurations, it can be shown that
wVLH < w
NV
LH = w
NV
LL (8)
and also that
wVHH < w
NV
HH = w
NV
HL . (9)
This result holds when Situation (i) occurs and k is suﬃciently high, namely when competition is
mild, or when Situation (ii) holds, ability prevails for the vocational principal (meaning that γ must be
low) and k is still suﬃciently high, namely when the non-vocational principal is relatively more eﬃcient.
We refer the reader to Appendix D for the detailed analysis of all possible instances.
The intuition for this result is the following: both when Situation (i) holds and when ability prevails
and γ is low, then internal incentive compatibility for the vocational principal is such that motivated
agents do not cumulate large information rents. These agents are thus oﬀered low wages. This fact
depressed the left-hand side of the above inequalities. On the other hand, when k is high, principals are
suﬃciently diﬀerentiated and this raises the wages that are paid in the standard sector, thus raising the
right-hand side of the inequalities above.
So we indeed observe a compensating wage diﬀerential across the two sectors which is entirely driven
by the intrinsic motivation and does not depend on the diﬀerences in workers’ ability. Nonetheless, ability
does matter in that inequality (8) is easier to be satisﬁed than inequality (9). In other words, it might be
the case that a compensating wage diﬀerential exists for high ability types but not for low ability workers
or that the wage diﬀerential experienced by high ability workers be larger than the wage gap existing
for low-skilled workers. This supports the empirical ﬁndings that the compensating wage diﬀerential is
increasing in ability and that the wage penalty across sectors is more severe at the top of the wage ladder
rather than at the bottom. The fact that the public sector wage penalty is higher for managers and top
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executives with respect to lower levels in the hierarchy is documented by Roomking and Weisbrod (1999)
and Bargain and Melly (2008) among others.17
Finally, note that when the wage diﬀerential is in place, it is always the case that eVLH > e
NV
LH = e
NV
LL
and eVHH > e
NV
HH = e
NV
HL . Hence, eﬀort provision is higher in the vocational sector where wage rates are
lower.
Let us consider now the diﬀerence between return to ability in the mission-oriented (wVLH − wVHH)
and in the standard sector

wNVLL −wNVHL

. In particular, if
wVLH −wVHH < wNVLL −wNVHL ,
then the power of incentives is lower in the mission-oriented sector because, in equilibrium, the gain from
increased ability is lower in such a sector.
By analyzing wages in the diﬀerent equilibria one can check that the mission-oriented sector is char-
acterized by low power of incentives in a superset of the region of parameters where the wage diﬀerential
exists. In particular, it realizes in the same situations where workers exert a higher eﬀort in the mission-
oriented than in the standard sector. Conversely, the mission-oriented sector never displays lower power
of incentives when the degree of competition is intermediate and principal V is relatively more eﬃcient.
In the end, a lower power of incentives in the mission oriented market is compatible both with a high
and with a low level of competition between the two principals.
The remark that follows ﬁxes the main ideas illustrated in this section.
Proposition 5 When the standard sector is relatively more eﬃcient (k is high), (i) a compensating
wage diﬀerential occurs and motivated workers receive a lower salary in exchange for a higher level of
eﬀort provision with respect to non-motivated workers; (ii) in the mission-oriented sector, the power of
incentives is lower than in the standard sector.
Result (i) suggests that, when the competitor is characterized by an eﬃcient technology, it might
be particularly worth for a ﬁrm to diﬀerentiate itself according to the choice of a mission. Indeed, our
framework could be extended to allow principals to endogenously determine their missions, in line with
Besley and Ghatak (2005).
6 Conclusion
Some recent papers on intrinsic motivation (Besley and Ghatak 2005, Delfgaauw and Dur 2008 and
2010) analyze the problem of sorting of workers with diﬀerent characteristics, being motivation one of
17We refer the reader to the excellent review of the literature contained in Delfgaauw and Dur (2010).
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them, to diﬀerent ﬁrms/sectors where jobs vary in intrinsic qualities. Typically, two or more competing
ﬁrms/sectors are considered: in some of them workers care about the organizational mission or intrinsi-
cally value their personal contribution to the ﬁrm’s outcome and in another employees only care about
extrinsic rewards.
We contribute to this literature by analyzing a framework were each sector is represented by a ﬁrm
interested in the exclusive services of a worker. The latter has private information on her skills and on
her motivation to contribute to the ﬁrms’ outcome. Firms diﬀer both in their production technology and
in the mission they pursue and a motivated worker is keen to be hired by the mission-oriented ﬁrm. From
a technical point of view, we characterized the optimal contracts oﬀered by two competing principals in
the presence of bidimensional adverse selection, where contracts are characterized by an eﬀort level and
a wage rate.
Our aim is to study the sorting of worker’s types into the diﬀerent sectors and to make predictions
relative to the average motivation and average ability of workers in each sector. In particular we are
interested in assessing whether workers with low ability tend to be hired in the mission-oriented sector
and thus whether a selection bias might cause a wage penalty for motivated workers employed by the
mission-oriented ﬁrm.
We ﬁnd that, when the ﬁrms’ technology is not too diﬀerent so that no ﬁrm strictly dominates the
other one, then the market is fully segmented: agents sort themselves by motivation, with motivated types
being employed by the mission-oriented principal and non-motivated types being hired by the standard
principal.
We also show that a wage penalty in the mission-oriented sector can be observed when the degree of
competition is not too high and the standard ﬁrm is relatively more eﬃcient. Such a wage gap is not
caused by a selection bias because workers sort themselves along the dimension of motivation while the
most able workers are evenly distributed across sectors. When motivated workers suﬀer a wage penalty,
our model also predicts higher eﬀort levels and lower power of incentives in the mission oriented sector.
In general, equilibrium contracts are deﬁned by the tension between competition, leading to ﬁrst-best
eﬀort levels, and information rents extraction that drives to downward eﬀort distortions. As a result
eﬀort distortions are decreasing in the degree of competition between the two ﬁrms.
Our results extend the ﬁndings of Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) to the context of asymmetric information
about both worker’s characteristics, that is intrinsic motivation and ability and to the case of strategic
interaction between the ﬁrms/principals representing the two sectors of the labor market. Under complete
information and perfect competition, Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) show that, when intrinsic motivation is
output-oriented, that is when intrinsic motivation depends on eﬀort or on one’s personal contribution to
output, then selection into the public sector is ability-neutral. Such a result is conﬁrmed in our setting.
We also add to Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), where asymmetric information on both workers’ motivation
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and laziness is considered. In their framework the standard sector is perfectly competitive and thus
non-strategic and the mission-oriented sector is cost-minimizing and interested in hiring only two worker
types at most. Moreover, their setting does not allow the comparison of average productivity between
the two sectors.
A Appendix
B Competition under full information
Wages oﬀered by the two principals in equilibrium are:
w∗VLH =
k2
2	

outside option
+
1
2
(1 + γ)2 − γ (1 + γ) 	
 
net cost of eﬀort
w∗VHH =
k2
2θ	

outside option
+
1
2
(1 + γ)2
θ
− γ (1 + γ)
θ 	
 
net cost of eﬀort
w∗NVLL =
1
2	

outside option
+
1
2
k2	

cost of eﬀort
w∗NVHL =
1
2θ	

outside option
+
1
2θ
k2 	
 
cost of eﬀort
(10)
Where the ﬁrst part in the expression covers the outside option (the best oﬀer of the competitor) while
the second part rewards the (net) cost of the ﬁrst best eﬀort.
Note that outside options do not depend on intrinsic motivation.
We can summarize the equilibrium under full information as follows.
Remark 2 Competition under full information when 1 < k < 1+γ. The market is fully segmented:
principal V hires motivated workers while principal NV hires non-motivated ones. All eﬀort levels are at
the ﬁrst best and wages are the ones described in (10). Both principals earn positive proﬁts on the types
they hire and workers receive a positive utility corresponding to the best oﬀer that the less productive ﬁrm
is able to make.
In the case of k = 1 and k = 1 + γ principals are equally productive in hiring non-motivated and
motivated types respectively. The tie is broken in favor of the more productive principal. Thus, when
k = 1 principal V is hiring all the workers and is earning positive proﬁts only on motivated ones. When
k = 1 + γ principal NV is hiring all the workers and is earning positive proﬁts only on non-motivated
ones.
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C Optimal contracts with competing principals
As mentioned in the main text, when 1 ≤ k ≤ 1 + γ and none of the principals is fully dominant, we
proceed by taking one of the regimes in which principal NV might ﬁnd himself (starting from Case 1
and moving to Case 5 ) as given. We then solve for the vocational principal’s optimal incentive schemes
and ﬁnally check whether the value of UVLL −UVHL thus obtained is compatible with the selected case for
principal NV.
C.1 PNV is in Case 1
When the non-vocational principal is in Case 1, the only binding participation constraint is PCNVHL .
Therefore, type HL must be indiﬀerent between the two sectors and PCVHL must be binding as well. The
vocational principal oﬀers to this type the ﬁrst-best eﬀort level and makes zero proﬁts from this type of
agent, whereby eVHL =
1
θ and U
TS,V
HL =
1
2θ .
C.1.1 Motivation prevails
Suppose further that motivation prevails for the vocational principal, whereby optimal eﬀort levels must
be ordered as eLH > eHH > eLL ≥ eHL.18
Full separation of types One could solve a problem in which each type of worker gets a diﬀerent
contract and in which the binding constraints are the downward incentive compatibility ones ICLHvsHH ,
ICHHvsLL and ICLLvsHL together with PCHL. Solving the binding constraints for the wage rates,
substituting them into the principal’s objective function and maximizing it with respect to eﬀort levels
(omitting eHL which is already determined) yields
eLH = 1 + γ eHH =
1+γ
2θ−1 eLL =
1−2γ
3−2θ eHL =
1
θ
.
This candidate solution with full separation of types exists for θ < 32 and
4(θ−1)
(2θ+1) = γ
M < γ < γM = 3(θ−1)2θ ,
where inequalities γM < γ and γ < γM , respectively, are equivalent to the monotonicity conditions
eHH > eLL and eLL > eHL.
19 Proﬁts to the vocational principal from hired types LH and HH are equal
to
πM,FS = 14

θ(1+γ)2
(2θ−1) +
(1−2γ)(θ−4γ+2θγ−1)
(3−2θ)2 −
(2θ−1)
θ2

. (11)
There remains to compute the outside option left by Principal V to type LL, which is given by UVLL =
wVLL − 12e2LL; substituting for wVLL = 12e2LL + (2θ−1)2θ2 (which has been found imposing ICLLvsHL to bind)
18From now on, when no confusion arises, we omit the superindex relative to the type of principal considered.
19All omitted participation and incentive compatibility constraints have been checked to hold ex-post. The same is true
for all subsequent problems but we avoid to repeat a similar statement each time.
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yields UVLL =
(2θ−1)
2θ2
and thus UVLL − UVHL = (θ−1)2θ2 . Such diﬀerence in reservation utilities is compatible
with PNV being in Case 1 if and only if (θ−1)
2θ2
< k
2(θ−1)
2(2θ−1)2 or else if and only if
k >
(2θ − 1)
θ
= k,
where k > 1 always holds while k < 1 + γ iﬀ
γ >
θ − 1
θ
= γ.
Note that γ < γM always holds, so the condition γ > γ is always veriﬁed when motivation prevails, and
k < 1 + γ is true in this case.
Pooling between non-motivated types LL and HL Suppose that PCVHL is till binding but that
a pooling contract is oﬀered to the non-motivated types whereby optimal eﬀort levels are ordered as
eLH > eHH > eLL = eHL =
1
θ , and wages are such that wHL = wLL =
1
θ (again, PV makes zero proﬁts
on types that he is not able to hire). Optimal eﬀort levels are given by
eLH = 1 + γ eHH =
1+γ
2θ−1 eLL = eHL =
1
θ
.
This solution exists when the monotonicity condition eHH > eLL is satisﬁed which is equivalent to
γ > θ−1θ = γ, and it holds for a superset of parameter conﬁgurations relative to the fully separating
solution when motivation prevails. Proﬁts for PV from the hired types LH and HH are given by
πM,PoolLL+HL = 18

(1 + γ)2 + (1+γ)
2
(2θ−1) − 2(2γ+1)θ

(12)
and it can be checked that πM,PoolLL+HL > πM,FS iﬀ γ > (θ−1)(3−θ)2θ(2−θ) = γ1 where γ1 < γ
M always holds
for θ < 32 . Hence when motivation prevails and both solutions with full separation and pooling between
non-motivated types are in place, then pooling is strictly preferred by PV to full separation and thus the
latter solution can be discarded. Finally, outside options for non-motivated types are the same as in the
previous case, whereby UVLL −UVHL = (θ−1)2θ2 and compatibility with Case 1 for PNV is still given by the
condition k > k.
C.1.2 Pooling between intermediate types
Suppose now that the optimal eﬀort levels oﬀered by PV are ordered as eLH > eHH = eLL > eHL. There
are two possible types of solutions with pooling of intermediate types, depending on whether ICHHvsHL
or ICLLvsHL binds ﬁrst.
Case (a) Suppose that ICHHvsHL is binding while ICLLvsHL is slack: we call this situation Case (a)
and denote it with the superscript Pa. Consider further PCHL and ICLHvsHH as binding constraints so
27
that optimal eﬀort levels are given by
eLH = 1 + γ eHH = eLL =
1+γ
2θ−1 eHL =
1
θ
.
Monotonicity condition eHH = eLL > eHL holds iﬀ γ > γ and ICHHvsHL is binding while ICLLvsHL is
slack iﬀ eHH = eLL + eHL >
2γ
θ−1 or else iﬀ γ < γ. Since these two conditions are incompatible, Case (a)
can be discarded.
Case (b) Suppose now that ICLLvsHL is binding while ICHHvsHL is slack: we call this situation Case
(b) and denote it with the superscript Pb. Consider further PCHL and ICLHvsLL as binding constraints
so that optimal eﬀort levels are given by
eLH = 1 + γ eHH = eLL =
2−γ
2 eHL =
1
θ
.
Monotonicity condition eHH = eLL > eHL holds iﬀ γ <
2(θ−1)
θ = γ
Pb = 2γ. Moreover, ICLLvsHL is
binding while ICHHvsHL is slack iﬀ eHH = eLL + eHL <
2γ
θ−1 or else iﬀ γ >
2(θ−1)(θ+1)
θ(θ+3) = γ
Pb. Hence
Case (b) exists iﬀ γPb < γ < γPb. Since γPb > γ, Case (b) coexists with the solution that is in place
when motivation prevails and there is pooling between non-motivated types. Proﬁts to PV when hiring
motivated types are given by
πPb = 18

(1 + γ)2 + (2−3γ)(2−γ)4 − 2(2θ−1)θ2

and it possible to show that πPb < πM,PoolLL+HL whenever the two solutions coexist. So Case (b) can be
discarded.
C.1.3 Ability prevails
Suppose now that ability prevails for the vocational principal, whereby the solution to the vocational
principal’s program must be such that optimal eﬀort levels are ordered as eLH > eLL > eHH ≥ eHL.
Here we follow Barigozzi and Burani (2013) and distinguish between two possible solutions with full
separation of types: Case A.a that holds when ICLHvsLL, ICLLvsHH and ICHHvsHL are binding or else
when eHH+eHL >
2γ
θ−1 and Case A.b that holds when ICLHvsLL, ICLLvsHL and ICHHvsLL are binding,
or else when eLL + eHL <
2γ
θ−1 < eLL + eHH .
20
Case A.a In Case A.a the binding constraints are the downward incentive compatibility constraints
ICLHvsLL, ICLLvsHH and ICHHvsHL together with participation constraint PCHL. In order for type
20Case A.a corresponds to Case A.1 and Case A.b corresponds to Case A.3 in the companion paper. When the distribution
of types is not uniform another case emerges, called Case A.2, which is such that the binding constraints are ICLHvsLL,
ICLLvsHL and ICHHvsHL and which holds for eHH + eHL <
2γ
θ−1
< eLL + eHL.
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LL to obtain a non-negative information rent from mimicking type HH it must also be the case that
eHH ≥ 2γθ−1 , which is a more restrictive requirement than eHH + eHL > 2γθ−1 . Optimal eﬀort levels are
given by
eLH = 1 + γ eLL = 1− γ eHH = (1+3γ)3θ−2 eHL = 1θ .
Monotonicity condition eLL > eHH holds iﬀ γ <
3(θ−1)
(3θ+1) = γ
Aa
1 while eHH > eHL holds iﬀ γ >
2(θ−1)
3θ =
γAa. Moreover the requirement eHH ≥ 2γθ−1 is satisﬁed iﬀ γ ≤ (θ−1)3θ−1 = γAa2 , but γAa2 < γAa and so this
candidate solution can be discarded.
Case A.b In Case A.b the binding incentive compatibility constraints are ICLHvsLL, ICLLvsHL and
(upward) ICHHvsLL together with participation constraint PCHL. Optimal eﬀort levels are given by
eLH = 1 + γ eLL =
(1−2γ)
(2−θ) eHH =
(1+γ)
θ = e
FB
HH eHL =
1
θ
.
Monotonicity condition eLL > eHH is satisﬁed iﬀ γ <
2(θ−1)
(θ+2) = γ
Ab while condition eLL + eHL <
2γ
θ−1
holds iﬀ γ > (θ−1)θ = γ where γ
Ab < γ. So the above conditions are not compatible and Case A.b can be
discarded.
Pooling between motivated types Suppose now that a pooling contract is oﬀered by PV to moti-
vated types whereby eﬀort levels are ordered as eLH > eLL > eHH = eHL =
1
θ . The incentive compati-
bility constraints that one assumes to be binding are ICLHvsLL, ICLLvsHH together with participation
constraint PCHL. Optimal eﬀort levels are
eLH = 1 + γ eLL = 1− γ eHH = eHL = 1θ .
This solution exists iﬀ γ < γ or else iﬀ the monotonicity condition eLL > eHH holds. Reservation utilities
are such that UVLL−UVHL = (2θ−1)2θ2 − 12θ =
(θ−1)
2θ2
as in the previous regimes and compatibility with PNV
being in Case 1 occurs for k > (2θ−1)θ = k. But note that k > 1 + γ holds whenever γ < γ so that the
condition k > k can never be satisﬁed in this case and this candidate solution must be discarded.
C.2 PNV is in Cases from 2 to 4
When the non-vocational principal is in Cases from 2 to 4, the binding participation constraints are both
PCNVHL and PC
NV
LL . Therefore, both PC
V
HL and PC
V
LL must be binding as well and both types HL and
LL must be indiﬀerent between the two sectors. The vocational principal oﬀers them ﬁrst-best eﬀort
levels and makes zero proﬁts from these types of agent, whereby eVHL =
1
θ and U
TS,V
HL =
1
2θ together
with eVLL = 1 and U
TS,V
LL =
1
2 . Now the diﬀerence in reservation utilities for non-motivated types is fully
determined and is equal to UTS,VLL − UTS,VHL = 12 − 12θ = (θ−1)2θ .
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C.2.1 Motivation prevails
Suppose that motivation prevails for the vocational principal, whereby optimal eﬀort levels must be
ordered as eLH > eHH > eLL = 1 > eHL =
1
θ . The binding constraints are the downward incentive
compatibility ones ICLHvsHH , ICHHvsLL together with PCLL and PCHL. Solving for the wage rates,
substituting them into the principal’s objective function and maximizing with respect to eﬀort levels
(omitting eLL and eHL which are already determined) yields
eLH = 1 + γ eHH =
1+γ
2θ−1 eLL = 1 eHL =
1
θ
.
This candidate solution exists for θ < 32 and γ < γM = 2 (θ − 1) , where inequality γ < γM is equivalent
to the monotonicity condition eHH > eLL and where γM < 1 whenever θ <
3
2 . Finally, proﬁts to the
vocational principal from hired types LH and HH are equal to
πM =
θ(1+γ)2−(2γ−θ+2)(2θ−1)
4(2θ−1) . (13)
The diﬀerence in reservation utilities UTS,VLL −UTS,VHL = (θ−1)2θ is compatible with PNV being in Case
2 if and only if k
2(θ−1)
2(2θ−1)2 < U
V
LL − UVHL = (θ−1)2θ ≤ k
2(θ−1)
2θ2
. As for the lower bound, it is satisﬁed when
k <
(2θ − 1)√
θ
= k,
where k > 1 always holds and k < 1 + γ is true iﬀ
γ >
(2θ − 1)−√θ√
θ
= γ,
where γ < γM . So k is always included in the interval (1; 1 + γ) when motivation prevails. As for the
upper bound, it is satisﬁed iﬀ
k ≥
√
θ = k,
with k > 1 and k < 1 + γ iﬀ
γ >
√
θ − 1 = γ
where γ < γM . Hence, k is also included in the interval (1; 1 + γ) when motivation prevails. Finally note
that
k < k < k (14)
always holds.
Conversely, PNV is in Case 3 for k
2(θ−1)
2θ2
< UVLL − UVHL = (θ−1)2θ ≤ k
2(θ−1)
2 . The lower bound is
satisﬁed for k < k while the upper bound holds iﬀ
k ≥ 1√
θ
= k4
where k4 < 1 always holds. So k ≥ k4 is always satisﬁed and Case 4 cannot be compatible with motivation
prevailing for PV .
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C.2.2 Pooling between intermediate types
Suppose that the ordering of optimal eﬀort levels is such that eLH > eHH = eLL = 1 > eHL =
1
θ . Now
the binding constraints are ICLHvsLL, PCLL and PCHL. Optimal eﬀort levels are
eLH = 1 + γ eHH = eLL = 1 eHL =
1
θ
and this solution exists iﬀ
γ ≥ θ − 1
2
= γP ,
with γP < γM , which ensures that ICHHvsHL is satisﬁed. Note that at this solution PV is making
positive proﬁts from type LH only, which are equal to
πP =
γ2
8
(15)
and which are always smaller than the proﬁts when motivation prevails. So this solution only holds for
γP ≤ γ < γM .
This solution is compatible with Case 2 for PNV iﬀ k < k ≤ k, where k < 1 + γ when γ > γ, with
γ > γP . Hence when γP < γ < γ we have k > 1 + γ so the condition k ≤ k is always satisﬁed. The
solution is also compatible with Case 3 holding for PNV when k ≥ k, where k < 1 + γ iﬀ γ > γ and
γ < γP . Thus, k < 1 + γ is always true when γP ≤ γ < γM and the pooling solution holds. Conversely,
Case 4 can be neglected because the diﬀerence in reservation utilities is incompatible with values k ≥ 1.
C.2.3 Ability prevails
Suppose now that ability prevails for PV and that the ordering of optimal eﬀort levels is such that
eLH > eLL = 1 > eHH > eHL =
1
θ . Again one has to distinguish between Case A.a and Case A.b
Case A.a In Case A.a the binding incentive compatibility constraints are ICLHvsLL and ICHHvsHL
together with participation constraints PCLL and PCHL. Optimal eﬀort levels are given by
eLH = 1 + γ eLL = 1 eHH =
(1+γ)
θ = e
FB
HH eHL =
1
θ
. (16)
The monotonicity condition eLL > eHH holds when γ < (θ − 1) = γA. This solution exists when
ICHHvsHL binds before ICHHvsLL, which occurs when 0 < γ <
(θ−1)
2 = γP < γA. Compatibility
conditions are the same as before, namely this solution is compatible with PNV being in Case 3 for
1 ≤ k ≤ k or in Case 2 for k < k ≤ k. But note that k < 1 + γ iﬀ γ > γ and γ < γP , then this solution
is only compatible with PNV being in in Case 3 when 0 < γ ≤ γ. Conversely, when γ < γ < γP , this
solution is compatible with PNV being in Case 3 for 1 ≤ k ≤ k or with PNV being in Case 2 for
k < k ≤ 1 + γ, given that k > 1 + γ when γ < γP .
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Case A.b In Case A.b the binding incentive compatibility constraints are ICLHvsLL and ICHHvsLL
together with participation constraints PCLL and PCHL. Optimal eﬀort levels are the same as in (16)
and this solution exists for γP ≤ γ < γA.Within these bounds, the monotonicity condition eLL > eHH is
satisﬁed and ICHHvsLL binds before ICHHvsHL. This solution coexists with pooling between intermediate
types, therefore a comparison between proﬁts associated with the two solutions is called for. Proﬁts in
this case are given by
πAb =
1
8

(1 + γ)2 + (1+γ)
2
θ − (4γ + 3− θ)

(17)
and they are always higher than proﬁts given by expression (15). Therefore Case A.b is chosen for
γP ≤ γ < γA, while pooling between intermediate types will be the solution only when γA ≤ γ ≤ γM .
Compatibility of this solution with Case 3 for PNV is ensured when 1 ≤ k ≤ k and with Case 2 when
k < k ≤ 1 + γ, being γ > γ∗. Again Case 4 can be discarded.
Before turning to Case 5 for the non-vocational principal, straightforward computations lead us to
observe that proﬁts which principal V makes when oﬀering a pooling contract to non-motivated types
and when PNV is in Case 1 are always strictly higher than proﬁts accruing to principal V given that the
rival principal NV is in Cases 2-4. In other words, proﬁts given by expression (12) are always strictly
higher than those in expressions (13), (15) and (17).21 Hence the following result holds.
Result 1 The vocational principal always prefers the pooling contract oﬀered to non-motivated types
(described in C.1.1), given that the non-vocational principal is in Case 1 , to any other optimal contract
that he proposes when the non-vocational principal is in Cases 2-4.
C.3 PNV is in Case 5
When the non-vocational principal is in Case 5, the only binding participation constraint is PCNVLL . Type
LL is indiﬀerent between the two sectors and PCVLL must be binding as well. The vocational principal
oﬀers the ﬁrst-best eﬀort level and makes zero proﬁts from type LL, whereby eVLL = 1 and U
TS,V
LL =
1
2 .
Conversely, type HL strictly prefers the non-vocational principal and is such that UNVHL > U
V
HL.
C.3.1 Motivation prevails
Suppose that motivation prevails for the vocational principal, whereby optimal eﬀort levels are ordered
as eLH > eHH > eLL = 1 ≥ eHL.
Full separation of types Assume that each type of agent is oﬀered a diﬀerent contract and that the
binding constraints are the downward incentive compatibility ones ICLHvsHH , ICHHvsLL, the upward
21Proﬁts associated with Case A.a are not displayed here but they are lower than those in (12) too.
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ICHLvsLL, together with PCLL. Solving for the wage rates, substituting them into the principal’s ob-
jective function and maximizing with respect to eﬀort levels (omitting eLL which is already determined)
yields
eLH = 1 + γ eHH =
1+γ
2θ−1 eLL = 1 eHL =
1
θ
.
This candidate solution exists for θ < 32 and γ < γM = 2 (θ − 1) , where inequality γ < γM is equivalent
to the monotonicity condition eHH > eLL and where γM < 1 whenever θ <
3
2 . The outside option of
type HL is UVHL = wHL − 12θe2HL. Substituting for wHL from the binding constraint ICHLvsLL one gets
UVHL =
1
2θe
2
HL +
(2−θ)
2 − 12θe2HL = (2−θ)2 . Hence the diﬀerence in reservation utilities for non-motivated
types is equal to UTS,VLL − UVHL = 12 − (2−θ)2 = (θ−1)2 and this solution is compatible with PNV being in
Case 5 for UTS,VLL − UVHL = (θ−1)2 > k
2(θ−1)
2(2−θ)2 or else for
k < (2− θ) = k4
where k4 < 1 always holds. So this solution can be discarded.
Pooling between non-motivated types Suppose that optimal eﬀort levels are such that eLH >
eHH > eLL = 1 = eHL. The binding constraints are the downward incentive compatibility ones
ICLHvsHH , ICHHvsLL, together with PCLL. Optimal eﬀort levels are given by
eLH = 1 + γ eHH =
1+γ
2θ−1 eLL = eHL = 1 .
The outside option for type HL is equal to UVHL = wHL − 12θe2HL = (2−θ)2 and is the same as in the
previous case. Hence, as before, the diﬀerence in reservation utilities UVLL−UVHL = (θ−1)2 is not compatible
with the bounds that deﬁne Case 5.
C.3.2 Pooling between intermediate types
Suppose that optimal eﬀort levels are ordered as eLH > eHH = eLL = 1 > eHL. Now the constraints that
one assumes to be binding are ICLHvsHH , PCLL and ICHLvsLL yielding optimal eﬀort levels
eLH = 1 + γ eHH = eLL = 1 eHL =
1
θ
.
But the diﬀerence in reservation utilities UVLL − UVHL is still the same as in the preceding regimes and
thus this solution can be discarded because it is not compatible with the bounds delimiting Case 5 for
PNV.
C.3.3 Ability prevails
Suppose that, in the mission-oriented sector, ability prevails and that the ordering of eﬀort levels is such
that eLH > eLL = 1 > eHH ≥ eHL.
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Full separation of types Now the only possible set of binding constraints is ICLHvsLL, PCLL,
ICHHvsLL and ﬁnally ICHLvsHH . Optimal eﬀort levels are given by
eLH = 1 + γ eLL = 1 eHH =
(2γ+1)
2θ eHL =
1
θ
,
where eHH is upward distorted. This solution exists when the monotonicity condition eLL > eHH is satis-
ﬁed, namely when γ < 2θ−12 . The reservation utility of typeHL is equal to U
V
HL =
(1−2γ)(1+2γ)+4θ(2γ−θ+2)
8θ
and thus the diﬀerence in reservation utilities becomes UVLL − UVHL = 12 − (1−2γ)(1+2γ)+4θ(2γ−θ+2)8θ =
4θ(θ−1−2γ)−(1−2γ)(1+2γ)
8θ which is lower than in the preceding cases and thus not compatible with the
bounds delimiting Case 5 for PNV.
Finally note that, when PNV is in Case 5, it is never optimal for the vocational principal to oﬀer the
null contract to type HL. Indeed, this type would always have an incentive to take the contract oﬀered
by PV to type LL and then ICVHLvsLL would always be violated.
Therefore, Case 5 for PNV can never be attained in equilibrium when principals compete and 1 ≤
k ≤ 1 + γ.
D Wage diﬀerentials and the power of incentives
Depending on the diﬀerent combinations of states of the world for the two principals, diﬀerent wages
characterize the optimal contracts. Let us consider each possible combination in turn.
Let us start with Situation (i) of Section 5.3. The non-vocational principal is in Case 1 and oﬀers
wages
wNVLL = w
NV
LH =
(2θ−1)2+θ2k2(4θ−3)
2θ(2θ−1)2 w
NV
HL = w
NV
HH =
(2θ−1)2+k2θ2
2θ(2θ−1)2
while the vocational principal oﬀers pooling contracts to non-motivated types and optimal wages oﬀered
to motivated types are
wVLH =
θ(2θ−1)2(1−γ)(1+γ)+θ(θ−1)(1+γ)2+(1+2γ)(2θ−1)2
2θ(2θ−1)2 w
V
HH =
θ2(1+γ)2−2γθ(1+γ)(2θ−1)+(1+2γ)(2θ−1)2
2θ(2θ−1)2 .
Then type HH gets a lower wage in the mission-oriented sector if and only if wVHH < w
NV
HH that is if and
only if
k >
√
(2γ−6θγ+θ2+2θγ2+6θ2γ−3θ2γ2)
θ = k5 ,
where k < k5 < 1 + γ. As for type LH we have w
V
LH < w
NV
LH if and only if
k >

(2γ−10θγ−3θ2+4θ3−2θγ2+10θ2γ+5θ2γ2−4θ3γ2)
θ2(4θ−3) = k6
with k6 < k5. Hence the wage gap is easier to observe for motivated workers with high-ability rather than
with low-ability. Moreover, k6 < k for γ <
(5θ2−5θ+1)−(2θ−1)
√
28θ3−16θ2−12θ4+1
θ(4θ2−5θ+2) = γ6 where γ6 > γ.Then,
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for suﬃciently low motivation, that is for γ ≤ γ < γ6, high-ability motivated workers always experience an
earnings penalty, independent of k. As for the power of incentives, we have wVLH−wVHH < wNVLL −wNVHL iﬀ
k >

(1+γ)(θ−γ(θ−1))
θ = k7, where k7 < k always holds. Hence we always observe low-powered incentives
in the vocational sector in Situation (i) .
Suppose now that we are in Situation (ii) of of Section 5.3.
When ability prevails for PV and Case A.a holds, while PNV is in Case 3, then wages in the non-
vocational sector are such that
wNVLL = w
NV
LH =
k2+1
2 w
NV
HL = w
NV
HH =
k2+1
2θ
(18)
while wages in the mission-oriented sector are such that
wVLH =
2γ+2−γ2
2 w
V
HH =
2γ+2−γ2
2θ
. (19)
Then, motivated types earn less in the mission oriented sector where they choose to work (irrespective of
their ability) if and only if
k >

1 + γ (2− γ) = k8,
where k8 < k for γ < γ8 = 1−

(2− θ), with γA > γ8 > γP . Hence, when PV is in CaseA.a, one observes
the wage diﬀerential for k8 < k < k. As for the power of incentives, one has w
V
LH −wVHH < wNVLL −wNVHL
iﬀ k8 < k < k, namely low-powered incentives are in place in the vocational sector precisely under the
same conditions under which an earnings penalty emerges.
When PNV is in Case 2 and k ≤ k < k while PV is still in Case A.a, the only wage that changes
with respect to expressions (18) and (19) is wNVHH which becomes lower and equal to w
NV
HH =
θ+1
2θ . Now,
motivated types always earn less in the mission-oriented sector and the wage diﬀerential is always in
place.
Low-powered incentives are also oﬀered in the mission-oriented sector, because wVLH−wVHH < wNVLL −
wNVHL holds iﬀ k >

(θ−1)(2γ+2−γ2)+1
θ = k9 but k9 < k, so inequality k > k9 is always satisﬁed in this
case.
Suppose now that ability prevails for PV and Case A.b holds while PNV is in Case 3, then wages
are the same as in expressions (18) and (19) except for wVHH which increases to w
V
HH =
2θ+1−(θ−γ)2
2θ . We
observe a wage gap for type LH only when γP < γ < γ8 and k8 < k < k but the wage gap never exists
for type HH. Low-powered incentives are oﬀered by the vocational principal iﬀ

(θ − γ2) = k10 < k < k.
If instead PNV is in Case 2 then the pay penalty is in place for type LH when γP < γ < γ8, or when
γ8 ≤ γ < γA and k8 < k < k occur whereas the pay gap exists for type HH when γP < γ < θ −
√
θ =
γ9 < γ8. And low-powered incentives are oﬀered by the vocational principal iﬀ k >

(θ2−(θ−1)γ2)
θ = k11;
but k11 < k therefore low-powered incentives are always oﬀered when PNV is in Case 2 and PV in Case
A.b.
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When PV oﬀers pooling contracts to types LL and HH, wages in the vocational sector are
wVLH =
2γ+2−γ2
2 w
V
HH = 1 .
Then, irrespective of whether PNV is in Case 2 or 3, type HH is always paid more in the vocational
sector, while the wage diﬀerential still exists for type LH provided that k8 < k < k. As for the power of
incentives, low-powered incentives are always in place when PNV is in Case 2 because the necessary and
suﬃcient condition is k >

1+(2−γ)θγ
θ = k12 and k12 < k. Finally, low-powered incentives are in place
when PNV is in Case 3 iﬀ

(2−γ)γθ−(θ−1)
(θ−1) = k13 < k < k.
To conclude, suppose that motivation prevails for PV so that wages in the vocational sector are
wVLH =
(1−γ)(1+γ)(2θ−1)2+(θ−1)(1+γ)2+(2γ+2−θ)(2θ−1)2
2(2θ−1)2 w
V
HH =
(1+γ)(θ+2γ−3θγ)+(2γ+2−θ)(2θ−1)2
2(2θ−1)2 .
Again, irrespective of whether PNV is in Case 2 or 3, both types HH and LH are always paid more
in the vocational sector, and the wage diﬀerential does not exist. Now, low-powered incentives are
never oﬀered in the mission-oriented sector when PNV is in Case 2, while they do arise for k14 =√
4θ(γ+θ−θγ)(γ+1)−(2θ−1)2
(2θ−1) < k < k when PNV is in Case 3.
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 Figure 1: Reaction function of principal NV when 1≤k≤1+γ.  
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Figure 2a: Case (i) for principal V. 
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Figure 2b: Case (ii) for principal V. 
 
